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A Quarterly Law Review
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XXV

SUMMER, 1950

NUMMER 4

"CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER"-ITS MEANING
AND SIGNIFICANCE*

N

OTWITHSTANDING its utilization for thirty-one
years, the clear and present danger formula remains
not only a determinant of doubtful applicability in many
freedom controversies, but also a concept of some uncertainty to the courts and the profession. A fuller inquiry
into its meaning and significance seems proper.
I.
Meaning of the Phrase "Clear and Present Danger"
No definition, states Mr. Justice Reed, can give an answer
to f'what is meant by clear and present danger." ' Although
Mr. Justice Black observed in 1941 that "restatement of
the phrase 'clear and present danger' in other terms has
been infrequent," 2 an inquiry into the meaning of the concept had best begin with an analysis of synonymic statement by the Court.
*This is the third in a series of articles on the clear and present danger
concept. "The Clear and Present Danger Formula: Its Origin and Application" appears in the May, 1950, issue of the University of Detroit Law Journal; and "The Rule of Clear and Present Danger: Scope of Its Applicability"
appears in the April, 1950, issue of the Michigan Law Review.
1 Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U. S. 331, 348, 66 S. Ct. 1029, 90 L. Ed.
1295 (1946).
2 Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 262 n. 3, 62 S. Ct. 190, 86 L. Ed.
192 (1941).
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Although the word "danger" has been objected to as
"highly emotional,"' there is as yet inadequate evidence
to justify a conclusion that its use has irrationalized the
Court in its task. As used here it simply means that there
must be a "grave" peril, 4 a "serious threat" ' that the evil
will result.' This is not a focal word on which judges will
debate or cases be decided.
More deserving of examination are the words descriptive
of the danger. What is a "clear" danger? Although it "cannot be completely captured in a formula,"' it means at
least that there must exist "reasonable ground to fear that
serious evil will result." ' The late Justice Murphy demanded "convincing proof that a legitimate interest of the
state is in grave danger." I Expressed otherwise, clear danger means that a "clear public interest" be "threatened not
doubtfully." "0 James Madison's words in 1776 afford an
interesting comparison. "All men are equally entitled to
the free exercise of religion," he wrote, "unless the preserSinsheimer, Employer Free Speech, 14 U. or Cm. L. R-y. 617, 718 (1947).
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 530, 532, 65 S. Ct. 315, 89 L. Ed.
430 (1945); West Virginia State Board of Education et al. v. Barnette, 319
U. S. 624, 639, 63 S. Ct. 1178, 87 L. Ed. 1628 (1943); see also id., 319 U. S.
at 643 (Black, J., concurring opinion); see Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S.
158, 176, 64 S. Ct. 438, 88 L. Ed. 645 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting opinion);
"Gravest abuses," Thomas v. Collins, supra, 323 U. S. at 530; "Aggravated
Danger", Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 105, 60 S. Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed.
1093 (1940).
5 Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S. 367, 373, 67 S. Ct. 1249, 91 L. Ed. 1546
(1947).
6 The Court has also said it must be a "public" danger; see Thomas v.
Collins, note 4 supra.
T See Bridges v. California, supra note 2, 314 U. S. at 261.
8 See Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 376, 47 S. Ct. 641, 71 L. Ed.
1095 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring opinion). Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S.
242, 258, 57 S. Ct. 732, 81 L. Ed. 1066 (1937). "Freedom of speech and
freedom of assembly are empty phrases if their exercise must yield to unreasonable fear." FRANKFuRTER, LAW AND PorITcs 122 (1939). "The test further
requires that the supposed danger be 'clear'--that is, there must be a reasonable expectation that the harmful consequence prohibited by law will ensue."
LianRans 68 (1944).
FRAwNEEL, OUR Cn
9 Prince v. Massachusetts, supra note 4, 321 U. S. at 176 (dissenting
opinion).
10 See Thomas v. Collins, supra note 4, 323 U. S. at 530. "Not merely
a likely threat." Craig v. Harney, supra note 5, 331 U. S. at 376.
3
4
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vation of equal liberty and the existence of the State are
manifestly endangered." 11 The Court will find a "clear"
danger when there is proof that the serious evil will almost
inevitably result from the particular exercise of freedom.
When is there a "present" danger? The Court has answered synonymously: when the peril is "imminent," 2
"immediate, )
"impending," 14 c"urgent," '" or "not remote." 6 In Bridges v. California,Mr. Justice Black, speakig for the Court, emphasized that "the degree of imminence [must be] extremely high before utterances can be
punished." 11 Elsewhere he has indicated that the danger
must be "pressingly imminent." 18 Justice Brandeis observed in Gilbert v. Minnesota that, "There are times when
those charged with the responsibility of Government, faced
with clear and present danger, may conclude that suppression of divergent opinion is. imperative; because the emergency does not permit reliance upon the slower conquest of
error by truth. And in such emergencies the power to suppress exists." 11 In Whitney v. Californiahe added: "....

no

danger flowing from free speech can be deemed clear and
11 BRANT, jAmS MADiso
246 (1941) Emphasis supplied.
12 See Abrams. v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 630, 40 S. Ct. 17, 63
L. Ed. 1173 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting opinion); Whitney v. California,
supra note 8, 274 U. S. at 376; Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 259,
62 S. Ct. 190, 86 L. Ed. 192 (1941); Thornhill v. Alabama, supra note 4, 310
U. S. at 105; Craig v. Harney, supra note 5, 331 U. S. at 373.
18 See Abrams v. United States, supra note 12, 250 U. S. at 630; West
Virginia State Board of Education et al v. Barnette, supra note 4, 319 U. S.
at 639. See also, Note, 51 YALE L. J. 798, 802 (1942).
14 "Actual or impending," Thomas v. Collins, supra note 4, 323 U. S. at
530, 532.
15 West Virginia State Board of Education et al. v. Barnette, supra note
4, 319 U. S. at 633.
16 Thomas v. Collins, supra note 4, 323 U. S. at 530. "The danger must
not-be remote or even probable; it must immediately imperil." Craig v. Harney, supra note 5, 331 U. S. at 376. ". . . the test to be applied . . . is not
the remote or possible effect." See Schaefer v. United States, 251 U. S. 466,
486, 40 S. Ct. 259, 64 L. Ed. 36 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting opinion).
17 Supra note 2, 314 U. S. at 263.
18 See West Virginia State Board of Education et al. v. Barnette, supra
note 4, 319 U. S. at 634 (concurring opinion).
19 254 U. S. 325, 338, 41 S. Ct. 125, 65 L. Ed. 287 (1920) (dissenting
opinion). Emphasis supplied.
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present unless the incidence of evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for
full discussion ... Only an emergency can justify suppres-

sion." And he concluded: "It is therefore always open to
Americans to challenge a law abridging free speech and assembly by showing that there was no emergency justifying
it." 2O Similarly, Justice Holmes stated: "Only the emergency that makes it immediately dangerous to leave the
correction of evil counsels to time warrants making any exception to the sweeping command, 'Congress shall make no
law ...

abridging the freedom of speech.' " 21 More recent-

ly, Justice Murphy re-emphasized that only the emergency
that makes it "immediately dangerous to leave the correction of evil counsels to time warrants making any" abridgment of freedom. 2
This is, then, or should be, the meaning of "present" danger: if there is time for the rational democratic processes
of thought and discussion, there is no present danger. As
so understood and applied, the clear and present danger
test can make a significant contribution to the delimitation
of constitutional freedoms. Freedom cannot be abridged if
it is only the fear of future evils that haunts the official.
Justice Murphy was speaking for the Court when he observed:"
There is a material. difference between agitation and ex-

hortation calling for present violent action which creates
a clear and present danger of public disorder or other sub-

stantive evil, and mere doctrinal justification or prediction
of the use of force under hypothetical conditions at some

indefinite future time-prediction that is not calculated or
intended to be presently acted upon, thus leaving oppor20

Supra note 8, 274 U. S. at 377. Emphasis supplied.

Abrams v. United States, supra note 12, 250 U. S. at 630-1. Emphasis
supplied.
22 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214, 233-4, 65 S.Ct. 193,
89 L. Ed. 194 (1944) (dissenting opinion).
23 Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118, 157-8, 63 S. Ct. 1333,
87 L. Ed. 1796 (1943).
21
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tunity for general discussion and the calm processes of
thought and reason.

In this sense, then-that fear of future evil of any kind is
unreasonable within the meaning of the test-it can be said
that "present" danger will be found when the Court has
"reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended
is imminent." 24
Meaning of the Term "Substantive Evils":
The substantiality of the evil, or the opposed societal
interest, may almost alone be determinative of many freedom controversies. Professor Chafee has of late concluded
that "outside the political and economic area at least ...
if the evil is found to be substantial, the law seems likely to
be upheld regardless of the unlikelihood that the evil will
ever come to pass." 2 Subject perhaps to a somewhat greater exception than he indicates, his conclusion is probably
justified.
What are the "substantive evils" the clear and present
danger of which may justify abridgments of freedom? As
recently as 1947 an able observer intimated that the only
substantive evil within the meaning of the test is violence.
"The practical significance of the rule," wrote Corwin, "is
that the Supreme Court reserves the right in connection
with any prosecution for forbidden utterances to say whether the defendant made them in circumstances which created
a 'clear and present danger' that they would lead to violence,
either the violence the defendant advocated, or any other
kind." 2 This is misleading. The cases amply illustrate
that the Court considers certain non-violent results "substantive evils," while, on the other hand, violence is not
always a substantive evil.
24
2
26

Whitney v. California, supra note 8, 274 U. S. at 376.
1 , CHA.Mn, GOVEMMMT AND MAss C00MUNcATIoNs 54 (1947).
Co~wnr, Tim CONSTUTO AND WHAT IT Mn.NS TODAY 157-8 (1947).
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In the case of origin, the particular evil was obstruction
of the war effort.27 This, to Justice Holmes, was admittedly not the only substantive evil, as witness his endorsement of the test in the post-war period in Gitlow v. New
York, wherein overthrow of the government by force was
the substantive evil involved.28 The "substantive evil"
was interference with the fair and orderly administration
of justice in the Bridges case,29 Pennekamp v. Florida,"°
and Craig v. Harney. 1 Breach of peace was also the purported substantive evil in Cantwell v. Connecticut,"2 Terminiello v. City of Chicago,33 Thornhill v. Alabama," and

Carlson v. California.5 In the last two cases interference
with the employer's right of privacy was advanced-unsuccessfully-as a substantive evil, while in West Virginia
8 lack of patriotic
State Board of Education v. Barnette,"
fervor was suggested as a substantive evil, though in vain.
The case of Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Co."
indicates that restraint of trade qualifies as a substantive
evil.
The overwhelming majority of individual and social
discomforts and legislative antipathies will never qualify
as "substantive evils." Meiklejohn is correct in his statement: "
In the judgment of the Constitution, some preventions
are more evil than are the evils from which they wbuld save
27 Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 39 S. Ct. 247, 63 L. Ed.
470 (1919).
28 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 45 S. Ct. 625, 69 L. Ed. 1138
(1925).
29 Supra note 2.
30 Supra note 1.
81 Supra note 5.
32 310 U. S. 296, 60 S. Ct. 900, 84 L. Ed. 1213 (1940).
33 337 U. S. 1, 69 S. Ct. 894, 93 L. Ed. 865 (1949).
34 Supra note 4.
35 310 U. S. 106, 60 S. Ct. 746, 84 L. Ed. 1104 (1940).
36 Supra note 4.
S" 336 U. S. 490, 69 S. Ct. 684 (1949).
38 Mmxxjom, FREE SPEEC AND ITS RxATiON To S=z-GovERimEr
48 (1948).
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us. And the First Amendment is a case in point. If that
amendment means anything, it means that certain substantive evils which, in principle, Congress has a right to
prevent, must be endured if the only way of avoiding them
is by the abridging of that freedom of speech upon which
the entire structure of our free institutions rests.

Justice Brandeis in his great concurring opinion in the
Whitney case insisted that the evil must be "serious.""
"Prohibition of free speech and assembly is a measure so
stringent," he said, "that it would be inappropriate as the
means for averting a relatively trivial harm." 4 Only
"substantial" evils will suffice, Justice Brandeis stated,41
and he continued by illustration:42
. . . it is hardly conceivable that this Court would hold
constitutional a statute which punishes as a felony the mere
voluntary assembly with a society formed to teach that
pedestrians had the moral right to cross unenclosed, unposted, waste lands and to advocate their doing so, even if
there was imminent danger that advocacy would lead to
a trespass. The fact that speech is likely to result in some
violence or in destruction of property is not enough to
justify its suppression. There must be the probability of
serious injury to the state.

The insistence upon gravity of peril finds popular expression in Meiklejohn; "The danger must be clear and present, but also, terrific." I
After quoting Brandeis to the effect that the evils must
be serious and substantial, Mr. Justice Black in 1941
added: "And even the expression of 'legislative preferences
or beliefs' cannot transform minor matters of public inconvenience or annoyance into substantive evils of sufficient weight to warrant the curtailment of liberty of ex89 Supra note 8, 274 U. S. at 376.
40

Id. at 377.

Id. at 379.
42 Ibid. As to the same effect, that the evil must be substantial, see
Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra note 32, 310 U. S. at 311; Thomas v. Collins,
supra note 4, 323 U. S. at 536; Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S. 1,
7, 65 S. Ct. 1416, 89 L. Ed. 2013 (1945).
48 Afornjonm, op. cit. supra note 38, at 51.
41
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pression."" He concluded significantly: "What finally
emerges from the 'clear and present danger' cases is a
working principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely
high before utterances can be punished." " More recently
the same Justice has re-emphasized that "States cannot
consistently with our Constitution abridge those freedoms
to obviate slight inconveniences and annoyances." 46 It
has been recognized elsewhere that only serious societal
perils will justify the denial of freedom.4 7
Beyond overthrow of the government by force and interference with the Nation's war effort, there may not be
many more "substantive evils." Mill wrote: "The sole
end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any
of their number, is self-protection." 48 Quite similarly, an
able scholar and practitioner states that under the clear
and present danger test, freedom is to be denied only
when "an immediate check is required to save the country." 49
There was dicta in the Cantwell 10 and Thornhill 51 cases
that any breach of the peace might constitute a substan44 Bridges v. California, supra note 2, 314 U. S. at 262.
45 Id. at 263. Quoted with approval in Pennekamp v. Florida, supra
note 1, 328 U. S. at 334.
46
Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Co., supra note 37, 336 U. S. at 496.
47 Whitney v. California, supra note 8, 274 U. S. at 377. "'Moreover, even
imminent danger cannot justify a prohibition of the functions essential to
effective democracy unless the evil apprehended be relatively serious." CEaa,
Faan SP EH 3x = UNrvw STATas 349 (1941). "'Clear and present danger'
means that there must be an imminent danger of serious evil." Walsh, Is the
New Judicial and Legislative Interpretation of Freedom of Speech, and of the

Freedom of the Press, Sound Constitutional Development, 21 Gao. L. J. 161,
183 (1933).
48

M.t,

Ox LiBERTY AND

CONSmIRATIONS

ON

REPRESENTATVE

Govaas-

8 (McCalium ed. 1946).
49 Hays, Book Review, 97 U. or PA. L. REv. 751 (1949).
50 "When clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with
traffic upon the public streets, or other immediate threat to public safety,
peace, or order, appears, the power of the State to prevent or punish is obvious."
See note 32 supra, 310 U. S. at 308.
UzT
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tive evil, but the words of Justice Brandeis foreshadowed
a contrary determination. The Court has now held that
':public inconvenience, annoyance or unrest" are not substantial evils." In the Terminiello case there was evidence
of actual rioting following the speech, but this evil was
not so serious and substantial as to justify punishment for
speech. And this must always be the result under the
clear and present danger test lest mobs and rowdies who
have planned violence can effectively deny expression by
ensuring the likelihood of attendant violence.
Justice Roberts nicely illustrated the point that most
evils are less than "substantive." In Schneider v. State,
he remarked: "The purpose to keep the streets clean and
of good appearance is insufficient to justify an ordinance
which prohibits a person rightfully on a public street from
handing literature to one willing to receive it." "
Allegation that governmental control of monopolistic
practices was a "substantive evil" was summarily dismissed, as it well deserved." Similarly rejected was the
claim that the injury to an industrial concern from peaceful picketing constituted such an evil.55 There are, however, rather clear indications that there are, even presently,
a few more substantive evils. Restraint of trade is almost
surely such.5 Even dicta is sufficient to support the conclusion that "destruction of life" will so qualify.
And
interference with the fair and orderly administration of
51 "The -power and the duty of the State to take adequate steps to preserve the peace and to protect the privacy, the lives, and the property of its
residents cannot be doubted. But no clear and present danger of destruction
of life or property, or invasion of the right of privacy, or breach of the peace
can be thought to be inherent in the activities of every person who approaches
the premises of an employer and publicizes the facts of a labor dispute involving the latter." See note 4 supra, 310 U. S. at 105.
52 Terminiello v. City of Chicago, note 33 supra.
55 308 U. S. 147, 162, 69 S. Ct. 155, 84 L. Ed. 155 (1939).
54 Associated Press v. United States, supra note 42.
55 Thornhill v. Alabama, note 4 supra.
56 Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Co., supra note 37.

57 Thornhill v. Alabama, supra note 4, 310 U. S. at 10S.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

justice well may be a serious societal evil.5" From Prince
v. Massachusetts," it seems safe to deduce that impairment of the health or morals of children is a substantive
evil. There is dicta that "fraudulent solicitation," "o "destruction of property," 61 and "invasion of the right of
privacy" 6 2 might constitute "substantive evils," but it remains to be seen if all of these will be held to qualify as
substantial.
Vague verbalizations such as "substantive evils within
the allowable area of state control," 63 "other immediate
threat to public safety, peace, or order," "' or "where the
public safety, morality or health is involved," " provide no
further clue to what will amount to a "substantive evil."
Furthermore, they are deceptive by their reference to
language of the police power which is not, of course, an
automatic definition of the constitutional freedoms.
Commentators, too, have been misleading in their use
of loose language that "criminal" activity is per se a substantive evil. Even Chafee contributes to such an implication when he says that the clear and present danger test
fixes "the boundary line of free speech . . . close to the
point where words will give rise to unlawful acts." 66
Fraenkel has also stated that the state may punish expressions if there is a clear and present danger "that they
will result in action harmful to the state." "i It is, of
course, proper to insist upon the proximity of the peril,
but there is an attendant obligation to avoid language inferring that "harmful" and "unlawful" acts always qualify
58
Craig
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67

Bridges v. California, note 2 supra; Pennekamp v. Florida, note 1 supra;
v. Harney, note 5 supra.
Supra note 4.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra note 32, 310 U. S. at 306.
Thornhill v. Alabama, supra note 4, 310 U. S. at 105.
Ibid.
Carlson v. California, supra note 35, 310 U. S. at 113.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra note 32, 310 U. S. at 308.
Thomas v. Collins, supra note 4, 323 U. S. at 536.
CHAF-r, op. cit. supra note 47, at 35.
FRAENxEL, TnE SuPmcu CouRT AND Cvm LiBERm
6 (1937).
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as substantive evils within the meaning of the concept. It
must be continually borne in mind that the Constitution
is the test of labels, and, in the weighing of societal utilities by the judiciary, public inconvenience or annoyance
does not become a "substantive evil" because it has been
made "unlawful" by some municipal council.
And courts are weighing societal interests when they
talk of "substantive evils" grave enough to outweigh constitutional freedoms when imminently endangered. This is
evident when the Court refers to "paramount interests"
that must be protected even at the interest of freedom of
communication." And so, when the Court speaks of "substantive evils," it has in mind grievous impairment of another equally or more important societal interest, such as
preservation of the state. If such a social interest is certainly and immediately imperiled by the exercise of freedom, then expression will be limited.
Is It Only a "Felicitous Phrase"?:
Mr. Justice Frankfurter seems to feel that clear and
present danger is but a "felicitous phrase." In his dissent
in the Bridges case in 1941, he said: 69
It was urged that the words "reasonable tendency" had
a fatal pervasiveness, and that their replacement by "clear
and present danger" was required to state' a constitutionally
permissible rule of law. The Constitution, as we have recently had occasion to remark, is not a formulary. Nor
does it require displacement of an historic test by a phrase
which first gained currency on March 3, 1919. Our duty
is not ended with the recitation of phrases that are the
shorthand of a complicated historic process. The phrase
"clear and present danger" is merely a justification for
curbing utterance where that is warranted by the substan68

Thomas v. Collins, supra note 4, 323 U. S. at 530. Semble: "grave

and immediate danger to interests which the state may lawfully protect."
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, supra note 4, 319 U. S.
at 639; "a legitimate interest of the state." Prince v. Massachusetts, supra
note 4, 321 U. S.at 176.
69 Sura note 2, 314 U. S. at 295-6.
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tive evil to be prevented. The phrase itself is an expression of tendency and not of accomplishment, and the literary difference between it and "reasonable tendency" is
not of constitutional dimension.

Again in dissent in the Barnette case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter developed his opposition to the formula. He wrote: 0
But to measure the state's power to make such regulations as are here resisted by the imminence of national
danger is wholly to misconceive the origin and purpose of
the concept of "clear and present danger." To apply such
a test is for the Court to assume, however unwittingly, a
legislative responsibility that does not belong to it. To
talk about "clear and present danger" as the touchstone
of allowable educational policy by the states whenever
school curricula may impinge upon the boundaries of individual conscience, is to take a felicitous phrase out of the
context of the particular situation where it arose and for
which it was adapted. Mr. Justice Holmes used the phrase
"clear and present danger" in a case involving mere speech
as a means by which alone to accomplish sedition in time
of war. By that phrase he meant merely to indicate that,
in view of the protection given to utterance by the First
Amendment, in order that mere utterance may not be proscribed, "the words used are used in such circumstances
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent." The "substantive evils"
about which he was speaking were inducement of insubordination in the military and naval forces of the United
States and obstruction of enlistment while the country was
at war. He was not enunciating a formal rule that there
can be no restriction upon speech and still less, no compulsion where conscience balks, unless imminent danger
would thereby be wrought "to our institutions or our government."

Concurring separately in the Pennekamp case in 1946,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter reiterated the theme, saying: 71
. . . it does violence to the juristic philosophy and the
judicial practice of Mr. Justice Holmes to assume that in
using the phrase "a clear and present danger" he was expressing even remotely an absolutist test or had in mind
TO Supra note 4, 319 U. S. at 663.
71 SuPra note 1, 328 U. S. at 352-3.
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a danger in the abstract. He followed the observation just
quoted by the emphatic statement that the question is one
"of proximity and degree," as he conceived to be most
questions in connection with the large undefined rights
guaranteed by the Constitution. And Mr. Justice Brandeis, coarchitect of the great constitutional structure of civil liberties, also recognized that "the permissible curtailment of
free speech is ... one of degree. And because it is a question of degree the field in which the jury may exercise its
judgment is, necessarily, a wide one." If Mr. Justice
Brandeis' constitutional philosophy means anything, it is
clear beyond peradventure that he would not deny to a
State, exercising its judgment as to the mode by which
speech may be curtailed by punishment subsequent to its utterance, a field less wide than that which he permitted a jury
in a federal court. "Clear and present danger" was never
used by Mr. Justice Holmes to express a technical legal
doctrine or to convey a formula for adjudicating cases.
It was a literary phrase not to be distorted by being taken
from its context. "The clear and present danger" to be
arrested may be danger short of a threat as comprehensive and vague as a threat to the safety of the Republic
or "the American way of life." Neither Mr. Justice Holmes
nor Mr. Justice Brandeis nor this Court ever suggested
in all the cases that arose in connection with the First
World War, that only imminent threats to the immediate
security of the country would authorize courts to sustain
legislation curtailing utterance. Such forces of destruction
are of an order of magnitude which courts are hardly designed to counter. "The clear and present danger" with
which its two great judicial exponents were concerned was a
clear and present danger that utterance "would bring about
the evil which Congress sought and had a right to prevent."
Among "the substantive evils" with which legislation may
deal is the hampering of a court in a pending controversy,
because the fair administration of justice is one of the
chief tests of a true democracy.
Most recently, in dissenting in Craig v. Harney, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter takes issue not so much with the appli-

cability of the test-it was utilized by the state court whose
judgment he would affirm-but rather with its interpretation by the majority of the United States Supreme Court.
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He stated: 2
If under all the circumstances the Texas court here was
not justified in finding that these publications created "a
clear and present danger" of the substantive evil that Texas
had a right to prevent, namely the purposeful exertion of
extraneous influence in having the motion for a new trial
granted, "clear and present danger" becomes merely a
phrase for covering up a novel, iron constitutional doctrine.
Hereafter the States cannot deal with direct attempts to
influence the disposition of a pending controversy by a summary proceeding, except when the misbehaviour physically
prevents proceedings from going on in court, or occurs in
its immediate proximity. Only the pungent pen of Mr.
Justice Holmes could adequately comment on such a perversion of the purpose of his phrase.

Sinoe the Justice's notion of the clear and present danger
concept is supposedly rooted in the thoughts of Justices
Holmes and Brandeis, a re-examination of their views can
indicate the extent of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's appreciation of the masters. In the very sentence in which Mr.
Justice Holmes originated the concept he stated: "The
question in every case is whether the words used are used
in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create
a clear and present danger. .

.

. " 11 It cannot seriously be

claimed that "in every case" was but statutory interpretation in view of the fact that Justice Holmes brilliantly argued for the application of the test to a state statute that
the Court's majority considered vastly different from the
Espionage Act of 1917. 74 Clear and present danger is "the
correct test," emphasized Justice Holmes.75 "It is apparent," writes Professor Freund, "that he found in the test
72 Supra note 5, 331 U. S. at 391. Recently Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
views seem to have been shared by Chief Justice Rosenberry of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court. "Whether there is a 'dear and present danger' warranting the
enactment of the statute is for the legislature," he writes. State v. Evjue, 253

Wis. 146, 33 N. E. (2d) 305, 311 (1948).
78 Schenck v. United States, supra note 27, 249 U. S. at 52. Emphasis
supplied.
74 Gitlow v. New York, note 28 supra.
75 Id., 268 U. S .at 673. Emphasis supplied.
Holmes in this dissent.

Justice Brandeis joined
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a useful measure of the range of free discussion where our
institutions are challenged in the public forum." 71 There
is evidence that Mr, Justice Frankfurter realizes that
Holmes refused to treat abridgments of First Amendment
freedoms in the same way as other legislative activity. In
1938 he wrote:77
These enduring liberties . .. were . .. specifically enshrined in the. Bill of Rights ... Because these civil liberties were explicitly safeguarded in the Constitution, or conceived to be basic to any notion of the liberty guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment, Mr. Justice Holmes was
far more ready to find legislative invasion in this field than
in the area of debatable economic reform.

And, as recently as 1949, he re acknowledged that "Mr.
Justice Holmes was far more ready to find legislative invasion where free inquiry was involved than in the debatable area of economics." 7'
To imagine that Mr. Justice Brandeis did not consider
"clear and present danger" to be a test is to remain
unappreciative of his words in Schaefer v. United States.
"There must be the clear and present danger," he wrote.
"Certainly men, judging in calmness and with this test
presented to them, could not reasonably -have said that
this coarse and heavy humor immediately threatened the
success of recruiting."11 For Mr. Justice Frankfurter
to ignore the difference between "tendency" and "clear
and present danger" is to defeat the efforts of Justices
Holmes and Brandeis who, when the majority decided to
apply the former test in the Schaefer case, reminded
their colleagues that ". . . the test to be applied .. .is
not the remote or possible effect. There must be clear
Fnzurm, OiT UNDEMsTAx DNG Tm SUPE
Co'URr 25 (1949).
77 FRAxxiurm, MR. JusTicr HomaNs
TD Tm SuP
ims
CoURT 51
(1938).
78 See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77, 95, 69 S. Ct. 448, 93 L. Ed. 37.9
(1949) (concurring opinion).
79 Supra note 16, 251 U. S. at 486 (concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Emphasis supplied.
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and present danger." 8' There is evidence, furthermore,
that at least in 1931 Mr. Justice Frankfurter realized
that Justice Brandeis believed in the clear and present
danger test.8
Likewise, there is indication that Mr. Justice Frankfurter once appreciated the constitutional freedoms and perhaps even the clear and present danger concept. He has
written: 82
If men cannot speak or write freely, they will soon cease
to think freely. Limits there are, of course, even to this
essential condition of a free society. But they do not go
beyond the minimum requirements of an imminent and substantial threat to the very society which makes individual

freedom significant.
Even in 1941 he admitted that the Court must look for
"a real and substantial threat to" the opposed societal
interest. "The threat must be close and direct . . . ," he
added."' It is doubtful if there is a constitutional differ-

ence between this language and that of "clear and present
danger."
It is an unfortunate misconception of our constitutional
society to ennoble the will of some municipal council
above the basic principles of freedom enshrined in the
Bill of Rights. Dean Pound has written:"
• ..we hear many urge today that judicial power as to unconstitutional legislation is something never intended and
its exercise is a judicial usurpation. But the clear understanding of American lawyers before the Revolution, based
on the seventeenth-century books in which they had been
taught, the unanimous course of decision after independence
and down to the adoption of the Constitution, not to speak
80 Ibid.
81 Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Brandeis and the Constitution, 45 HARv. L.
Ray. 33, 87-93 (1931).
82 Id. at 88. Emphasis supplied.
83 Bridges v. California, supra note 2, 314 U. S. at 303.
84
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Pound, The Development of Constitutional Guarantees of Liberty, 20
DAmE LAWYER 347, 395 (1945).
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of the writings of two of the prime movers in the convention
which drafted the instrument, are abundant proof to the
contrary.

One of the Founding Fathers wrote: "We may appeal
to every page of history for proofs irrefragible, that the
people when unchecked have been as unjust, tyrannical,
brutal, and barbarous as any king or senate of uncontrolled power. The majority has eternally and without
exception usurped the rights of the minority." " Mr.
Justice Frankfurter's brethren have reminded him that
"The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw
certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and
officials and to establish them as legal principles to be
applied by the courts." 86 And another old master to whom
Mr. Justice Frankfurter has looked for guidance can remind him that: "The great ideals of liberty and equality
are preserved against the assaults of opportunism, the
expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, the scorn and derision of those who have
no patience with general principles, by enshrining them
in constitutions, and consecrating to the task of their protection a body of defenders." 87
Carl Becker was sure that: 88
Jefferson and his contemporaries . . . were fully aware
that even in a republic the natural rights of man needed
to be safeguarded against another sort of tyranny-the tyranny of the majority. Against the tyranny of the majority,
85 See Part IV of ADAiS, A Dnrmsz or T
COxsTrUTiONAL GovENMENT oF THE UNITED STATES (1787).
86 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, supra note 4, 319

U. S. at 638. Almost certainly in reply to Mr. justice Frankfurter's contention
that liberty is to be protected by legislatures, rather than courts, Mr. Justice
Jackson added, 319 U. S. at 628: "One's right to life, liberty and property,
to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other
fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome
of no elections."
87 CARwozo, ME NATuRE oF THE JUDICiAL Paoczss 92-3 (1921).
88

BECKER, FREnom AND RESPONsIBILITY IN THE A3mRIcAN WAY or LITE

26 (1945).
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or at all events against hasty and ill-considered action by
the majority, the founding fathers endeavored, therefore, to
erect adequate safeguards.

Similarly, Professor Haines wrote: 8 9
To protect the minority against the danger of oppression
by majority rule was another purpose which the founders of
the American government set about to accomplish in the
process of constitution-making. It was thought by Madison
and others that the merits of the federal Constitution lay
in the fact that it secured the rights of the minority against
"the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority."

After observing that "majorities may be as unjust and
brutal as a despotic monarch," Professor Cushman attests to the belief of the founders of our Nation that
"Civil liberties could be made safe only if placed 'beyond
the reach of temporary majorities by being firmly imbedded in a carefully drawn bill of rights." '0 Another
competent scholar and practitioner concludes that "legislative majorities, because they so quickly reflect the passions and prejudices of the populace, cannot . . . be depended upon to protect the freedom of individuals." "
Significantly, it was Mr. Justice Frankfurter's mentor,
Justice Brandeis, who said of the Founding Fathers:
"Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the Constitution so that free speech
and assembly should be guaranteed." 92 There are recent
indications that Mr. Justice Frankfurter will again admit
that the "specifically enshrined" freedoms of expression
deserve a judicially independent examination in the fullest
sense because of the danger of the occasional tyrannies of
temporal majorities. In Kovacs v. Cooper; he acknowledged that "those liberties of the individual which history has
attested as the indispensable conditions of an open as
89
90

HAINES, Tna REviVAL or NATuRAL LAW CONCmS 82-3 (1930).
CUSHmAN, Civil Liberty and Public Opinion, in SArTUARDIN(G

LiBzRaT TODAY 84 (1945).
91 PATTERSON, FREE SPEEcH AND A FREE PR
3 (1939).
92 Whitney v. California, supra note 8, 274 U. S.at 376.
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against a closed society come to this Court with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties
which derive merely from shifting economic arrangements." " Indulgence in the whim of majorities accords no
legal significance to the First Amendment, and it is to be
hoped that Mr. Justice Frankfurter will soon completely
repudiate his judicial abdication in this area of constitutional freedom. Such a re-consecration to his task may
well be accompanied by his recognition of the test that has
best succeeded in giving legal significance to the fundamental freedoms--clear and present danger.
Is It a "Rule of Reason"?:
Mr. Justice Frankfurter has denominated the clear and
present danger formula a "rule of reason." 91 Initially
it was so referred to by Justice Brandeis who, writing in
1920, said: 95
This is a rule of reason. Correctly applied, it will preserve
the right of free speech both from suppression by tyrannous, well-meaning majorities, and from abuse by irresponsible, fanatical minorities. Like many other rules for human
conduct, it can be applied correctly only by the exercise of
good judgment; and to the exercise of good judgment calmness is, in times of deep feeling and on subjects which
excite passion, as essential as fearlessness and honesty. The
question whether in a particular instance the words spoken

or written fall within the permissible curtailment of free
speech is, under the rule enunciated by this Court, one of
degree.
Seven years later the United States Supreme Court
struck down a state statute, which was limitative of freedom, without reference to the language of clear and present danger because it was, in the Court's opinion, "an
arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of the police power of
Supra note 78, 336 U. S.at 95.
Bridges v. California, supra note 2, 314 U. S.at 296.
95 Schaefer v. United States, supra note 16, 251 U. S. at 482 (dissenting
opinion).
93
94
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the State, unwarrantably infringing the liberty of the defendant. .

. .

" Although the present Court-most par-

ticularly Mr. Justice Frankfurter-is unlikely to express
its rationale this way, it was only recently that Mr. Justice Reed said of his colleagues: "All agree there may be
reasonable regulation of the freedom of expression." 9'
So long as mortals sit upon the Court, and so long as
they utilize subjective criteria, they will probably determine the constitutionality of legislative abridgments of
freedom according to their ideas of reasonableness, be the
test expressed in terms of "clear and present danger" or
anything else.98 A jurist as consistently devoted to the
clear and present danger test as Justice Murphy once remarked: "We are concerned solely with the reasonableness
of this particular prohibition. . .. " "

There is no inexplicable paradox in the current Bench's
characteristic acquiescence in determinations of reasonableness by the legislature in regulations of other interests
while the Court manifests a greater willingness to avoid,
as unreasonable, legislative denials of freedom of speech,
press, religion and assembly. The absolute language of
the First Amendment--"no law"--must at least mean that
every attempt by temporary majorities to deny the fundamental freedoms is prima facie unreasonable or, other%ise expressed, burdened by a presumption of unconstitutionality.
The clear and present danger test is certainly not a "rule
of reason" in the sense that anything considered by the
legislature as having a reasonable relation to an anticipated
96 Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 380, 387, 47 S. Ct. 655, 71 L. Ed. 1108
(1927).
9T See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141, 155, 63 S. Ct. 862,
87 L. Ed. 1313 (dissenting opinion).
98 "In the United States, the judge, in virtue of his right to review the
law, inquires whether an act of the legislative body is reasonable . .
Ro ms-N, Tna NATURmL LAw 198 (1947).
99 Prince v. Massachusetts, supra note 4, 321 U. S. at 173.
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evil can be proscribed. Speaking of the First Amendment
freedoms, Mr. Justice Rutledge said for the Court:1 °0
Any attempt to restrict those liberties must be justified
by clear public interest, threatened not doubtfully or remotely, but by clear and present danger. The rational connection between the remedy provided and the evil to be
curbed, which in other contexts might support legislation
against attack on due process grounds, will not suffice. These
rights rest on firmer foundation.

Very little is to be gained, it is suggested, by labelling
the clear and present danger test a "rule of reason."
Courts will better contribute to an understanding and
appreciation of their constitutional role and responsibility
if they indicate, not that they are the sole oracles of reason,
but rather that the legislative expression is being annulled
because it is far outweighed by the greater, enduring
societal interest in freedom of expression-an interest of
whose dignity and weight the judiciary must be ever mindful under our Constitution.
Is It Simply the Old Incitement Test?:
Arthur Garfield Hays remarked recently:. 1
I often wonder whether there is anything new in the
doctrine announced by Mr. Justice Holmes. Direct incitements to crime are criminal. All that Mr. Justice Holmes
said was that there are words which in peace time might
not be incitements where the words might have a different
effect in time of war. In other words, conditions should determine whether or not the words are incitements to violation of law. The question is really not whether the utterances of certain words "will be endured" but whether .or
not they are incitements. Likewise the determination of the
fact of whether words are incitements would depend upon
whether or not they are imminent or serious. Isn't this about
what the clear and present danger doctrine really means?

Thirty years earlier the same thought had been expressed.
"The test laid down by Justice Holmes ...is that of corn100
101
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mon law incitement to crime," wrote one commentator. 2
And Professor Chafee recognizes the similarity: "This test
draws the boundary line very close to the test of incitement at common law." 103 Professor Black has likewise
observed that "the Schenek doctrine comes close to limiting
criminal liability to words which directly incite acts in
violation of law," although admittedly he detects a closer
analogy to the common law doctrine of criminal attempt.'0 4
Even before the announcement of the clear and present
danger test, Judge Learned Hand had indicated that utterances falling short of incitement could not constitutionally
be punished. In 1917 he wrote in an opinion: 0 5
Political agitation, by the passions it arouses or the convictions it engenders, may in fact stimulate men to the violation of law . . . Detestation of existing policies is easily

transformed into forcible resistance of the authority which
puts them in execution, and it would be folly to disregaxd
the causal relation between the two. Yet to assimilate agitation, legitimate as such, with direct incitement to violent
resistance, is to disregard the tolerance of all methods of
political agitation which in normal times is a safeguard of
free government. The distinction is not a scholastic subterfuge, but a hard-bought acquisition in the fight for freedom,
and the purpose to disregard it must be evident when the
power exists. If one stops short of urging upon others that
it is their duty or their interest to resist the law, it seems
to me one should not be held to have attempted to cause
its violation.

That there is a constitutional difference between incitement to crime and mere advocacy of violation of law was

recognized at an early date by Justice Brandeis. In the
Whitney case, he said: "But even advocacy of violation,
however reprehensible morally, is not a justification for
denying free speech where the advocacy falls short of in102
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See Note, 29 YALL L. J. 337-S (1919).
CAFE, FREEDOM OF SPFcH 89 (1920).
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citement and there is nothing to indicate that the advocacy
would be immediately acted on." "' It is evident that this
great exponent of the clear and present danger test considered it, in its application to political expression, a criterion at least as severe as the incitement test known to
the common law.
One of the greatest sociologists has expressed his belief
that something comparable to an incitement test is needed
to protect adequately the institutions of the group. Malinowski wrote in 1944: "In any case where speech is direct
incitement to action which is dangerous to the freedom of
others, rather than freedom of debate and submission of
principles, we should exclude every statement which leads
to activities forbidden by what we have defined as the
constitutional, civil and criminal laws prevalent in a democracy.... ,

"

It is interesting to note, too, that England

has utilized an incitement standard in demarcating a large
area of speech considered dangerous to the state. 0 8
Although at one time Justice Holmes felt that anyone
who counselled crime was beyond constitutional protections,
on another occasion he emphasized that not even incitements would always satisfy his clear and present danger
test. In the early case of Frokwerk v. United States 109
he reflected: "We venture to believe that neither Hamilton
nor Madison, nor any other competent person then or later,
ever supposed that to make criminal the counselling of
murder within the jurisdiction of Congress would be an
unconstitutional interference with free speech." However,
in the later Gitlow case the Justice was clear that not all
106 Supra note 8, 274 U. S. at 376.
107
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221.4 (1944).

108 The Incitement to Mutiny Act, 1797, 37 GEo. 3, c. 70, § 1, provides
for the punishment of "any person who shall . . . incite or stir up . . . per" See also R. v. Bowman,
son or persons to commit any act of mutiny ...
[1912] 22 Cox C. C. 729.
109 249 U. S. 204, 206, 39 S. Ct. 249, 63 L. Ed. 561 (1919).
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incitements, if any, were constitutionally punishable. He
wrote: 110
It is said that this Manifesto was more than a theory,
that it was an incitement. Every idea is an incitement. It
offers itself for belief and if believed it is acted on unless
some other belief outweighs it or some failure of energy
stifles the movement at its birth. The only difference between the expression of an opinion and an incitement in
the narrower sense is the speaker's enthusiasm for the result.

Meiklejohn is convinced that Justice Holmes rejected the
test "that speech which incites men to action is, as such,
debarred from the First Amendment," 11 and he believes
that Holmes intended a test more protective of freedom. 1 " '
To Riesman, however, "the clear and present danger test
means . . . that only innocuous and academic incitements
to the overthrow of the existing government will not be
labeled sedition." 118
Notwithstanding the Court's affirmance of Gitlow's conviction in 1925 for advocating overthrow of the government, the Holmes-Brandeis philosophy might well influence
the present Court to insist upon at least direct incitement
under the clear and present danger test. However, in 1943
Professor Cushman could see "no reason to suppose that
the Supreme Court would decide the Gitlow case differently
today from what it did in 1925." 114 And, although the
Court refused to insist upon the minimum of incitement
when it denied certiorari in Dunne v. United States,1 1 5
this refusal to review may not justify the belief that a
Court which has elsewhere recognized the propriety of the
110 Supra note 28, 268 U. S. at 673.
111
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112 Id. at 47 et seq.
118 Riesman, Civil Liberties in a Period of Transition, 3 PuBLIC PoLMY
33, 38-9 (1942).
114 Cushman, Some Constitidional Problems of Civil Liberties, 23 B. U.
L. Rxv. 335, 344 (1943).

115 138 F. (2d) 137 (8th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 790, 64
S. Ct. 205, 88 L. Ed. 475 (1943).
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clear and present danger test will condone penalties for
mere advocacy. As Fraenkel has noted of the "Smith
Act": 155 "No inference as to the constitutionality of the
sedition part of the law can be drawn from this refusal,
since the conviction rested also on a charge of causing
disaffection in the armed forces." 116

Analogizing the clear and present danger test to the incitement test may have value when the former criterion is
applied to prosecutions for violation of sedition and syndicalism statutes, but the attempted parallel is fruitless,
if not deceptive, in a whole host of free speech, press,
religion and assembly controversies. The concept of incitement nowhere provides for evaluation of the substantiality
of the societal interest imperiled by expression. As the
Terminiello case "' well illustrates, incitements to minor
social inconveniences cannot justify denials of expression,
even though the resultant activity be labelled "criminal"
by the temporal majority in control of some municipality."'
Furthermore, the incitement rule is an unsatisfactory description of the "proximity and degree" aspect of the clear
and present danger standard. Expansion, if not distortion,
of definition would be required to denominate many expressions of religion and the other freedoms, such as standing silently during flag salutes, as "incitements" to any
serious societal antipathy.
The incitement analogy fails completely in the application of the clear and present danger formula to non-criminal situations. It is suggested that use of this analogy will
only obfuscate further the judicial role in the delimitation
of liberty, and its use should therefore be discouraged.
115a

116
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117 Supra note 33.

118 "We know that all incitement to action may not be abridged or
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Does It Shift the Burden or Quantum of Proof?:
In devising the clear and present danger test, Justice
Holmes, according to an able scholar, "put the burden of
proof, in effect, on the legislature by requiring that the evil
be 'substantive' and 'that the danger of its eventuation be
'clear and present.' """ Similarly, Justice Murphy indicated that the burden is upon the state to prove the necessity of abridging freedom and the propriety of the means
chosen. In the Prince case he wrote: "The burden was
therefore on the State of Massachusetts to prove the reasonableness and necessity of prohibiting children from engaging in religious activity .... " 120 This -is the extent of
the Supreme Court's acknowledgement of a shifted burden
in freedom controversies, although it is implicit in the
recognition of a presumption of unconstitutionality. 2 '
Speaking for the Court in the Pennekamp case, Mr. Justice Reed explained that "for circumstances to create a
clear and present danger . . . a solidity of evidence should
be required .... " "I What constitutes such a measure of
evidence is unclear, 'but the language of the Court indicates it will require an unusual quantum of proof to justify
abridgment of the First Amendment freedoms. When the
government threatened the sanction of deportation after
alleged Communist Party associations in Schneiderman v.
United States, the Court insisted that the "evidence must
be clear, unequivocal, and convincing." 12' Cases concerned
with the more common criminal sanctions have not disclosed a similar judicial insistence, although Mr. Justice
Reed followed his "solidity of evidence" language with the
119 Barnette, Mr. Justice Murphy, Civil Liberties and the Holmes Tradition, 32 CORNEzx L. Q. 177, 181 (1946).
Supra note 4, 321 U. S. at 173.
121 See United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations, 335 U. S.
106, 140, 68 S. Ct. 1349, 92 L. Ed. 1849 (1948) (concurring opinion of justice
120

Rutledge, joined in by Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy).
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suggestion that we "Compare Baumgartnerv. United States
and Schneiderman v. United States." 124
Recognition of the "preferred position" of the funda1 25
mental freedoms means, according to Green, that:
. . . clear and present danger may perhaps now be said to

require that in the balancing of interests there must be
placed in the scales, against the social value of the governmental abridgment, a heavy (and uniform) weight representing the absolute value of the freedom, apart from and
in addition to the Court's estimate of the social value of
the utterance in the particular case.

Unfortunately, "preferred places" and "weights" are
vagaries devoid of legal significance. Nor has "a solidity
of evidence" much more judicial meaning. It has been
recognized that a presumption of unconstitutionality is
"implicit in the rule" of clear and present danger, 126 and
the affixation of such a taint to all ordinances and statutes
abridging freedom of speech, press, religion and assembly
will accord import and legal significance to the deliberate
constitutional enshrinement of these liberties far more constantly and effectively than "weights" and "preferences."
11.
Evaluation of the Clear and Present Danger Concept
Every sooio-political group must, if it is to survive, safeguard its basic political institutions. And societies usually
have other interests which they are unwilling to have
jeopardized. Accordingly, organs of the state will somewhere along a line anticipatory of calamity say "Freedom
ends here." Absolutists will aver that expression should
never be punished, and at the other extreme it will be
argued that freedom must be denied whenever it "tends"
to evil. As Justice Holmes early recognized, it is a question
124
125
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of "proximity and degree." 12

And, as Fraenkel has noted,

"The difference is one of emphasis, difficult either to define
or to illustrate." 128

The clear and present danger cases

"do not purport to mark the furthermost constitutional
boundaries of expression," according to Mr. Justice Black,' 29
but they are points on the line, shifting with the composition and mood of the Court and generally occupying an
intermediate position.
Libertarians have argued that the clear and present danger test is undesirable as an admission that the fundamental freedoms can be abridged by a temporal majority,
in derogation of the absolutist language of the First Amendment. Meiklejohn, for instance, claims that "it has, in
effect, led to the annulment of the First Amendment rather
than to its interpretation," 130 and he calls it "a peculiarly
inept and unsuccessful attempt to formulate an exception
to the principle of the freedom of speech." ' Similarly,

Baldwin writes: "When the United States Supreme Court
laid down the rule that Congress could, in violation of the
First Amendment, abridge free speech if there were in particular cases 'clear and present danger

. . .

' the door was

opened wide enough for legal suppression to enter. And it
has come in and made itself at home since." 132 It is "a
dangerous and unwarranted breach in the Constitution and
the First Amendment" according to another.'
Inasmuch
as libertarians frequently believe that "public" speech is
never to be denied, and practically all of them agree that
abridgments are not to be tolerated until dangerous activity
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ensues, no subjective test limitative of liberty would be
satisfactory to them.
Ernest Sutherland Bates feels that clear and present
danger "itself is clearly a dangerous principle," because it
can "be applied successfully only by men of Justice
Holmes' caliber-and such men are few." I" This test is
no more "dangerous" to the cause of freedom than any
other subjective test; certainly far less so than some. In
its implicit denial of other societal interests,"3 5 an absolutist
approach to freedom is both unrealistic and unwise. An
overthrown government is unable to provide much protection for an unpopular speaker. The clear and present danger formula has facilitated decisions solicitous of freedom
far better than any other test with which it has competed,
and practical liberals should appreciate its contributions to
the cause of freedom. The record of the recent Court is
proof that a Holmes is not needed to protect liberty through
application of the formula, although Bates is obviously
right in intimating that a court unsympathetic to the particular expression can find it a clear and present danger
to some societal interest. No subjective test, however, is
insurance against the personal predilections of the bench.
Ethereal criticism of the clear and present danger concept
will exert little influence upon the judiciary charged with
delimiting liberty, or upon serious thinkers concerned with
working out a feasible formula for the solution of clashing
societal interests.
Some observers, on the other hand, feel that the clear
and present danger criterion is unsafe in that it does not
adequately protect the security of the state.'36 The Illinois
Supreme Court in 1932, after argument that the test was
134
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applicable, was nevertheless convinced that "the legislature
has authority to forbid the advocacy of a doctrine designed
and intended to overthrow the government without waiting
until there is a present and imminent danger of the success
of the plan advocated." 131 "If the State were compelled
to wait until the apprehended danger became certain," the
court explained, "then its right to protect itself would come
into being simultaneously with the overthrow of the government, when there would be neither prosecuting officers
nor courts for the enforcement of the law." 1"8 And the
majority of the United States Supreme Court in 1925 approved this as "aptly said." 139 It is, however, quite unnecessary to fear that the clear and present danger test
will prevent a court so disposed from punishing words far
in advance of society's overthrow. The very case in which
the test originated should have constituted ample proof of
this. In Schenck v. United States,"' the Court had no difficulty finding a clear and present danger without any semblance of governmental overthrow. State courts have also
illustrated how very readily expressions can be punished
with the clear and present danger standard, although any
overthrow of anything was far in the future.141
Is the Test Too Subjective and Uncertain?:
The subjectivity of the clear and present danger criterion
is occasionally singled out for attack. Bates wrote: "The
principle of Justice Holmes still leaves -the application of
the law in any given instance a matter of conjecture, since
man's conception of danger is notoriously subjective; a
danger clear to one will be laughed at by another." 142
18T
188
189
140
141
Boloff,

People v. Lloyd, 304 Ill. 23, 35, 136 N. E. 505 (1922).
Ibid.
Gitlow v. New York, supra note 28, 268 U. S. at 669.
Schenck v. United States, note 27 supra.
People v. Malley, 49 Cal. App. 597, 194 Pac. 48 (1920); State v.
138 Ore. 568, 4 P. (2d) 326 (1931).

142 BATEs, THis LAND or LmERTY 159 (1930).
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Similarly, Whipple states: "Words that to one man seem
perfectly harmless are viewed by another as likely to produce imminent dangers." And he added that "no man
can know in advance what words he will be punished
for." 143 Sherman opines: "The clear and present danger
test seems somehow inadequate. Where do we draw the
line to mark off the statements . . . which are permissible
and what are not so? Does not the formula become purely
subjective depending upon the judge?" '" And, in the
same vein, Green writes: "Clear and present danger modified the old rule of 'dangerous tendency' by adding a different emphasis; but it is still a subjective test.... Indeed,
the Court is now required to appraise, with no fixed objective standard, not only the danger of the evil, but the
social value of the utterance." 14 56 Admittedly, clear and
present danger is a subjective test. The case of Craig v.
Harney 141 illustrates how the United States Supreme Court
detected no such peril, although a state court had perceived
such danger. This is, however, a characteristic of all -the
tests from which the clear and present danger standard has
received serious competition. As Radin has aptly observed:
"It is hard to see how subjectivism can be avoided or how
the personality of 'the judge can be made to count for
nothing . . . . 147 Admittedly, too, a court applying the
test has the difficult and delicate task of weighing opposed
societal interests, but it must be realized (and Green must
know) that the courts faced this responsibility, though
148 W3iPPLt, OuR AccIENT LimaTms 96 (1927).
144 Sherman, Freedom of Speech and the Need for Public Order, 26
DxcTA 217, 219 (1949).
145 Green, The Supreme Court, the BM of Rights and the States, 97
U. or PA. L. Rav. 608, 636 (1949). See also Note, 24 ST. JoHN's L. Rlv.
83, 85 (1949): "The term 'clear and present danger' has many connotations,
of course, and the court in any given instance must subjectively determine
what is a 'clear and present danger' to a large degree unaided or perhaps
unhampered ,by precedent. What to one court or judge may be a 'clear and
present danger,' may not be to another court or judge."
146 Supra note S.
147 Radin, Statutory Interpretation,43 HAv. L. R. 863, 881 (1930).
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often unconsciously, before and without the application of
the clear and present danger standard. Nor is such a responsibility imposed upon the judiciary solely in freedom
controversies.
Similarly, the test is at times said to be uncertain. "The
'clear and present danger' rule defies exact definition,"
writes one commentator.' 48 "It has yet to be defined in
such manner as to permit any degree of certainty in its
application," according to Justice Spence of the California
Supreme Court.' 49 Mr. Justice Reed once referred to the
test as having the "vice of uncertainty," although he
readily acquiesced in applying the criterion.' ° Walsh
charges that "the clear and present danger test ...

is not

definite," 1-1 and Teller has similarly asserted: "The 'clear
and present danger' test has by no means been clarified. .

.

. " "I In 1940 Professor Swisher was of the belief

that the clear and present danger doctrine "is significant
in terms of theory, but the doctrine is so vague as to constitute a highly indefinite standard. .

.

. " "I And two years

later Riesman charged that "the formula proved unilluminating," because the Court divided in Abrams v. United
States, 5 ' Pierce v. Society of Sisters,'55 and in the Schaefer
case, and because convictions were sustained in the Frohwerk case and in Debs v. United States,1 56 where he felt
"the conduct . . . seems quite as far removed from en-

dangering the prosecution of the war as was -the conduct
See Note, 24 NOTRE DAims LAWYER 236, 239 (1949).
See Danskin v. San Diego Unified School District, 28 Cal. (2d) 536,
171 P. (2d) 885, 889 (1946) (dissenting opinion).
150 Pennekamp v. Florida, supra note 1, 328 U. S. at 334.
1'1 Walsh, Is the New Judicial and Legislative Interpretation of Freedom
of Speech, and the Freedom of the Press, Sound Constitutional Development?, 21 Gao. L. J. 161, 182 (1933).
152 Teller, Picketing and Free Speech, 56 HARv. L. Rv. 180, 196 n. 74
(1942).
153 Swisher, Civil Liberties in Wartime, L. V. PoL. Sc. Q. 321, 330-1
(1940).
154 Supra note 12.
155 268 U. S. 510, 45 S. Ct. 571, 69 L. Ed. 1070 (1925).
156 249 U. S. 211, 39 S.Ct. 252, 63 L. Ed. 566 (1919).
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in the Abrams case itself." "I When the majority failed to
apply the clear and present danger criterion in any of
these cases, it is as unwise as it is unfair to condemn the
formula as "unilluminating."
Another writer who admits the utility of the test in the
usual freedom controversy claims it is too subjective and
indefinite when freedom of the press is opposed by the
interest in an impartial administration of justice. He
charges that:'5 8
• . . while the test has practical validity in determining
whether there is actual danger of the destruction of the government .

..

it has no bearing or materiality when applied

to the coercion of the judicial mind. The determination as
to when words present an "imminent danger" of leading to
insurrection, or fomenting a breach of peace, or organizing
criminal syndicalism, though concededly difficult in given
fact situations, nevertheless seems possible of accomplishment by rational process. Testing whether printed or
spoken words constitute a "clear and present danger" of subverting the judicial process, however, leaves courts with
results reached by undisclosed convictions or, what is even
worse and perhaps more likely, mere visceral sensation.
Danger to the government's physical control over its territories can be regarded objectively. The possible effect on
the mind of the judge being subjected to an ostensibly intimidating attack and on the mind of the individual litigant whose day in court has become a mere sideshow while
his case is argued on the newsstands, are too subjective to
be measured by such supposed criteria.

It should be suggested that the clear and present danger
concept necessitates no psychoanalysis of litigants. It might
also be recalled that the test superseded by this standard
(to which the writer presumably would have us return)
permitted the punishment of publications that had a "reasonable tendency" to obstruct the administration of jus157 Riesman, Civil Liberties in a Period of Transition, 3 PUBLIc PoLIcY
33, 41 (1942).
158 Wickham, The "Clear and Present Danger" Test in Constitutionality

of Proceedings to Punish for Contempt by Publication During Pending Case,
[1948) Wis. L. Rxv. 125, 130-1.
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tice, 1 59 and it is proper to ask if any lesser investigation
into the mind and fortitude of the judge was required by
such standard. Difficulty in determining the intereference
with the administration of justice has inhered for centuries
in the law of contempt, and adoption of the clear and present danger test in this situation adds nothing subjective to
traditional and necessary perplexities.
Every student of the problem should realize that some
measure of uncertainty will, at least initially, characterize
any subjective test. "Those who desire their constitutional
standards capsuled will search, especially in this field, in
vain." 160 Certainty and guidance will accrue, however, from
"the gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion," 161 as the continued application of the test demarcates areas of permissible expression. In 1927 it was well
enough for Justice Brandeis to admit that "This Court has
not yet fixed the standard by which to determine when a
danger shall be clear; how remote the danger may be and
yet be deemed present," 162 but by 1941 the Court could
truthfully recognize that the "language of the Schenck case
has afforded practical guidance in a great variety of cases in
which the scope of constitutional protections was in issue." 163 If the test be for the moment unclear, it is no
more uncertain than any other subjective test. Listen to
Professor Freund commenting on the tendency test: "To
know what you can do and what you may not do and how
far you may go in criticism is the first condition of political
liberty. To be permitted to agitate at your peril, subject
159 Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U. S. 402, 38 S. Ct.
560, 62 L. Ed. 1186 (1918).
160 Cohen and Fuchs, Communism's Challenge and the Constitution, 34
CORNELL L. Q. 352, 365 (1949).
161 Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 104, 24 L. Ed. 616 (1877).
Chief Justice Hughes indicated that where constitutional principles are involved, "the process of construction is essential to fill in the details." Home
Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 426, 54 S. Ct. 231,
78 L. Ed. 413 (1934).
162 Whitney v. California, supra note 8, 274 U. S. at 374.
163 Bridges v. California, supra note 2, 314 U. S. at 262.
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to a jury's guessing at motive, tendency and possible effect,
makes the right of free speech a precarious gift." 164 The
foremost authority on freedom of speech has concluded
that the clear and present danger "test, though not automatic, is much more practicable 'than any other which has
been authoritatively suggested." 165 Elsewhere it has been
described as "the nearest approach to a concrete test," 166
and "the most exact definition yet devised." 167
The United States Supreme Court has indicated its
expectation that "from the formula's repeated application
by the courts, standards of permissible comment ... [will]
emerge . .

168

and the belief is not at all unjustified.

Apparent or initial subjectivity of standard is not the enduring serious defect imagined, for certainty and even objective rule derive from continued judicial application of
the determinant.
In the delimitation of liberty, the flexibility of subjective
criteria is far preferable to rigidity of rule. When "it is
a Constitution we are expounding," 169 "convenient vagueness" 170 susceptible of varying limits in time of peace and
war, and permissive of expanding freedom with societal
maturation is not only advantageous but imperative. A
jurist who has faced and studied the task has observed: 171
In the last analysis, any test as to what constitutes an

unlawful abridgment of freedom of speech and of the press
is bound to present difficulties inherent in the very nature
of the problem. It is a question of degree, of reason, and

of good judgment. Any test, necessarily, is general and
164 Ernst Freund, The Debs Case and Freedom of Speech, New Republic,
May 3, 1919, p. 13.
165 CHAI'EE, THE INQumiRNG MmD 132 (1928).
166 Note, 24 ST. JoH's L. REv.83, 85 (1949).
167 Note, 41 HARV. L. REv. 525, 528 (1927).
168 Pennekamp v. Florida, supra note 1, 328 U. S. at 334.
169 See McCullough v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 407, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819)
(Chief Justice Marshall).
170 See Hough, Due Process of Law--Today, 32 HARV. L. REv. 218 (1919).

171 Shientag, From Seditious Libel to Freedom of the Press, 11 BRooxLYN L. RV. 125, 153 (1942).
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flexible, depending upon the time, the place, the particular
occasion and the surrounding circumstances.

To decry 'the subjectivity of standard in this area is to
utter ill-advised criticism.
Is a mechanical jurisprudence induced by utilization of
the clear and present danger test? It has been so charged
by Mr. Justice Frankfurter. After reminding us again that
"The Constitution is not a formulary," 12 he continued his

attack in the Pennekamp case when he stated: "Formulas
embodying vague and uncritical generalizations offer tempting opportunities to evade the need for continuous
thought." 173 He claims that " 'Clear and present danger'
was never used by Mr. Justice Holmes to express a technical legal doctrine or to convey a formula for adjudicating
cases." 174 And Justice Frankfurter adds: "It does an ill-

service to the author of the most quoted judicial phrases
regarding freedom of speech, to make him the victim of a
tendency which he fought all his life, whereby phrases
are made to do service for critical analysis by being -turned
into dogma." ""' Most recently in his dissent in Craig v.
Harney, the Justice belabored the same point. By the decision, he alleges, "'clear and present danger' becomes
merely a phrase for covering up a novel, iron constitutional
doctrine... Only the pungent pen of Mr. Justice Holmes
could adequately commenft on such a perversion of the
purpose of his phrase." 17

There is ample evidence that Justice Holmes considered
clear and present danger a test--it need not be repeated
here. But it is proper to express a doubt that Mr. Justice
Frankfurter weighed more consciously or intelligently the
opposed societal interests in the aforementioned cases than
did his brethren of the majority "confused" by the work172
178
174

175
176

See Bridges v. California, supra note 2, 314 U. S. at 295.
Supra note 1, 328 U. S. at 351.
Id. at 353.
Id. at 352.
Supra note 5, 331 U. S. at 391.
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ing principle of clear and present danger.' 77 The difference
between the Court's majority and Mr. Justice Frankfurter
lies far less in anyone's succumbing to the "tempting opportunities to evade the need for continuous thought," than
in disparate hierarchies of values.'
Discarding or avoiding statement of test or principle can accomplish little to
reconcile such a divergence. It is suggested that utilization of the test can stimulate a more conscious search for
opposed societal interests and encourage a more intelligent
weighing of the need for restriction-somewhat preferable
to suspected projection of judicial prejudices.
The application of the clear and present danger formula
has afforded "an opportunity for sympathetic judges to protect a wider area of free discussion," 179 but it would be
naive to imagine that it is any more or less liberal than the
high court justices who administer it. The record is clear
that even the United States Supreme Court is willing to
overlook the test when they are unsympathetic to the particular expression,'
and the standard, like any other, will
produce liberal decisions only, in 'the words of one commentator, "so long as it is wielded by a willing arm." 's'
"Clear and present danger of substantive evil" is essentially a "working principle" 182 for weighing societal utilities, with an implicit recognition of added weight to the
interest in expression flowing from the deliberate constitu177

Note the language of Mr. Justice Reed:

".

.

. reviewing courts are

brought in cases of this type to appraise the comment on a balance between
the desirability of free discussion and the necessity for fair adjudication, free
from interruption of its processes . . . We must, therefore, weigh the right
of free speech which is claimed by the petitioner against the danger of the
coercion and intimidation of courts in the factual situation presented by this
record." Pennekamp v. Florida, supra note 1, 328 U. S. at 346.
178 Most evident in Craig v. Harney, supra note 5, where Mr. Justice
Frankfurter would have upheld the trial court which had applied the clear
and present danger test and insulated the judiciary from criticism.
179 Note, 51 YA.x L. J. 798, 801 (1942).
180 See Prince v. Massachusetts, note 4 supra.
181 Green, The Supreme Court, the Bill of Rights and the States, 97
U. or PA. L. Rnv. 608, 636 (1949).
182 Bridges v. California, supra note 2, 314 U. S. at 263.
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tional enshrinement of these "preferred" values, and with
the added emphasis that only a virtual certainty that the
opposed societal interest be immediately and gravely endangered will justify abridgment of the fundamental freedoms. This careful balancing of societal interests has been
thought to be the extent of utility of the concept. Wechsler, for instance, states: "In short, what the clear and present danger test can do, and all that it can do, is to require
an extended judicial review in the fullest legislative sense
of the competing values which the particular situation presents." "I That this is the test's raison d'etre has been
recognized by other observers.' 84 Nevertheless, Professor
Freund expresses quite unjustified fears that the clear and
present danger formula may deter rather than encourage
a conscious weighing of opposed societal interests. He
5
alleges: 18
The truth is that the clear-and-present-danger test is an
oversimplified judgment unless it takes account also of a
number of other factors: the relative seriousness of the danger in comparison with the value of the occasion for speech
or political activity; the availability of more moderate controls than those which the state has imposed; and perhaps
the specific intent with which the speech or activity is
launched. No matter how rapidly we utter the phrase "clear
and present danger," or how closely we hyphenate the words,
183 Wechsler, Symposium on Civil Liberties, 9 Am. L. SchooL REv. 881,
887 (1941).
184 "..
. it appears that the present Supreme Court considers the 'dear
and present danger' rule merely a convenient phrase to adorn a decision in
reality grounded on what is termed, 'a balance between desirability of free
discussion' [and the opposed societal interest]." Note, 24 NOTRE DAM LAWYER
236, 240 (1949). "There must be a balancing of interests . . . To help strike
this balance, the Supreme Court has developed the rule that to justify a speech
restriction there must be a 'clear and present danger.'" Note, CALIr. L. REv.
596, 601 (1948). "The clear and present danger rule . . . was regarded as
'a working principle' in reconciling the apparent conflict between a person's
freedom and the operations of government." Sherman, Loyalty and the Civil
Servant, 20 RocKy MT. L. Ray. 381, 383 (1948). "The dear and present danger
rule . . . has been frequently employed to strike a balance between the exercise
of governmental authority and the protection of rights guaranteed in the First
Amendment." Emerson and Helfield, Loyalty Among Government Employees,
58 YALE L. J. 1, 85 (1948).
185
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they are not a substitute for the weighing of values. They
tend to convey a delusion of certitude when what is most

certain is the complexity of the strands in the web of
freedoms which the judge must disentangle.

This criticism has little merit. Implicit in the very use of
the clear and present danger working principle is the judicial inquiry into the "relative seriousness of the danger."
A comparison of opposed values is inherent in every determination that the opposed interest is "substantive." And
any attempt to evaluate the "occasion" of the expression
is utterly unwise. Society's interest in receiving new ideas
does not hinge upon whether they are announced at national
political conventions or from soapboxes. Exploration into
the possibility or desirability of more moderate controls is
not a judicial but a legislative task far beyond attainment
under the limitations of case-to-case adjudication. Furthermore, to suggest exploration into the subjectivity of the
speaker's intent is to be particularly unhelpful in this area.
It is perplexing how a conscientious scholar can hinge constitutional freedom upon intent in the light of the doctrine
of constructive intent run riot in World War I sedition
trials. There is no justification for a revival of this pernicious doctrine. Lastly, there is no proof whatever that
the Court has been subjected to "a delusion of certitude"
from utilization of the clear and present danger formula.
Instead, the available evidence indicates that this "working
principle" has stimulated the judiciary to an awareness of
the clash of societal interest and has encouraged a more
intelligent evaluation of the necessity for abridging freedom.
Some commentators feel that clear and present danger
is not so much a test as it is a judicial policy, philosophy
or attitude. Mosher, for example, writes:. 8 6
This doctrine, as distinguished from the "reasonableness" test, implies a different social and political philosophy,
for it insists upon a stronger, more positive justification for

curtailment of civil rights. The "clear and present danger"
186 Mosher, Mr. Justice Rutledge's Philosophy of Civil Rights, 24 N. Y.

U.L. REv. 661, 666 (1949).
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philosophy expresses an attitude which regards the freedoms
protected by the First Amendment as fundamental to our
framework of democracy, and requires more than a mere
showing of rationality before these basic rights may be restricted.
187

Likewise Emerson and Helfield write:

Both the test of "reasonableness" and the test of "clear
and present danger" are broad formulae which do not decide concrete cases. Upon analysis both resolve into issues
of balancing competing values. Yet the "clear and present
danger" rule implies a different social and political philosophy in approaching the constitutional issue. It implies that
the courts will insist upon a stronger, more positive justification for governmental infringement upon freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment. It expresses an attitude which
regards these freedoms as fundamental to our framework of
democracy and holds it the function of the courts to demand more than a mere showing of rationality before such
rights may be sacrificed.

And Sherman similarly observes that, "The clear and present danger test is itself not a rigid rule or formula. It is
more of an attitude or approach through which the Court
evaluates personal rights and freedoms against the interference of government."

188

Like these others, Cohen and

Fuchs look upon clear and present danger as "a sense of
the importance of free speech rather than a formula that
determines. .

.

. " "I Quite similarly, Biddle believes that

the particular value of the concept lies in its insistence upon
a standard of approach, both cautious and realistic. 9 '
Admittedly, clear and present danger is indicative of a
judicial philosophy cognizant of the import of freedom in
a democracy. Assuredly, too, it is subjective and anything
but an automatic solution of conflicting interests. Nevertheless, clear and present danger of substantive evil is-as
Justice Holmes pointed out-"the correct test." '

Surely,

187 Emerson and Helfield, supra note 184, at 86.
188 Sherman, supra note 184, at 385.
189 Cohen and Fuchs, Communism's Challenge and the Constitution, 34
CoRNELL L. Q. 352, 365 (1949).

190 BIDDLE, MR. JusCE HoLMEs 156 (1946).
191 See Gitlow v. New York, supra note 28, 268 U. S. at 673 (dissenting

opinion).
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courts are balancing societal utilities when they speak of
clear and present danger, but it is that and something
more; it is an insistence that there be imminent peril to
the opposed societal interest-what Wechsler recognized as
"the one item of genuine strength that the clear and present
danger test has." 192 And, although it is understandable

that observers may see in the phrase an attitude of favor
to the fundamental freedoms inasmuch as most applications of the test have protected liberty, its place as a test
is perceived more readily by noting the instances wherein
its use has upheld denials of expression.
Application of the clear and present danger standard will
annul very few expressions of the national majority will.
High court jurists are apt to mirror the hierarchy of sociolegal values of the common culture,'93 and there are already
signs that the Court pays to the Congress, even where First
Amendment freedoms are concerned, a greater deference
than to state legislatures or municipal councils.' 94 In reversing convictions under municipal ordinances and state
statutes, the Supreme Court is not denying the democratic
process, but -is rather-as it must in many situationsbalancing the local interest against the national. 9 ' To our
constitutional society the Court has the responsibility of
intelligently balancing interests even where the Congress
abridges freedom-the interest of a temporal majority and
the evaluation of interest of the Nation's permanent majority as expressed in the Constitution.
Wechsler, supra note 183 at 888.
193 In the sole reversal of conviction under a federal law, the Supreme
Court posited it upon lack of proof of the required intent, rather than upon
absence of clear and present danger. Hartzel v. United States, 322 U. S. 680,
64 S. Ct. 1233, 88 L. Ed. 1534 (1944).
194 See, e.g., United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75, 67 S. Ct.
556, 91 L. Ed. 754 (1943).
195 Cf., e.g., Thomas v. Collins, note 4 supra, or Martin v. City of
Struthers, 319 U. S. 141, 63 S. Ct. 862, 87 L. Ed. 1313 (1943). For further
indication that a problem of federalism is involved, note the language of Mr.
justice Reed for the Court in Pennekamp v. Florida, supra note 1, 328 U. S.
at 335: "Were it otherwise the constitutional limits of free expression in the
192

Nation would vary with State lines."
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To recognize that the clear and present danger formula
facilitates an intelligent, conscious weighing of societal interests is not to say that it permits balancing against an opposed societal interest the judge's notion of the worth of the
expression. It should be noted well that the clear and
present danger concept demands an inquiry into the substantiality of the evil-which is but an indirect way of
appraising society's value in the opposed interest-but it
nowhere demands or even permits a judicial exploration
into the "substantiality" of the ideas expressed. There is
a societal interest in expression, recognized and enshrined
in the Constitution, and it is this interest that courts are
to weigh in applying the clear and present danger test.
Because the formula assumes a constant societal interest
in expression, it is avoided by judges inclined to project
their personal values into the task of delimiting freedom
of expression. It is noteworthy that the worst decisions of
the Supreme Court have been those in which it avoided
application of the concept and permitted projection of their
own actions of ideational worth.
The clear and present danger test will remain but a
subjective criterion handy to express the libertarian predilections of any judge, but just as available to condone
denials of freedom, unless and until from within its implicitness is extracted and recognized by the Court the
presumption of unconstitutionality to all attempted abridgments of the First Amendment freedoms by temporal majorities. A recent scholarly article states: 9 8
Although Justice Douglas did not expressly rely on the
presumption against constitutional validity of legislation pertaining to civil rights in his majority opinion in the Terminiello case, that presumption is at least implicit in his

statement of the "clear and present danger" test. He has
assented to the doctrine in the past as have other members
of the majority. The "presumption against validity" in civil
rights cases serves as one of the most important components
196
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used by the Court as it applies the test of "clear and present
danger." A realization of the importance of this presumption in the disposition of civil rights cases is basic to an
understanding of the methodology utilized by the present
Court.

What Wechsler has said about the presumption of constitutionality in other areas---"The existence and role of such
a presumption is of the highest importance for the future
of the law" 97-- is equally true of the presumption of unconstitutionality for attempted legislative denials of the
First Amendment freedoms.
Lastly, appreciation of the clear and present danger
formula must begin with a realization that verbalization
of any subjective principle is never a solution to controversy. Justice Holmes was right in remarking that, "The
boundary at which conflicting interests balance cannot be
determined by any general formula in advance, but points
in the line, or helping to establish it, are fixed by decisions
that this or -that concrete case falls on the nearer or farther
side." 198 Similarly Charles Evans Hughes stated that "the
protection both of rights of the individual and those of
society rests not so often on formulas, as to which there
may be agreement, but on a correct appreciation of social
conditions and a true appraisal of the actual effect of conduct." 199 There are enough decided cases to indicate that
unanimity of belief in the applicability of a particular
criterion is no assurance of uniformity of result. 200
By its stimulus to conscious evaluation of opposed societal interests, and by its recall to the judicial mind of the
Nation's omnipresent interest in freedom of expression, the
clear and present danger test deserves perpetuation.
Chester James Antieau
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